Fragments of first-order temporal logic are useful for representing many practical privacy and security policies. Past work has proposed two strategies for checking event trace (audit log) compliance with policies: online monitoring and offline audit. Although online monitoring is space-and time-efficient, existing techniques insist that satisfying instances of all subformulas of the policy be amenable to caching, which limits expressiveness when some subformulas have infinite support. In contrast, offline audit is brute force and can handle more policies but is not as efficient. This paper proposes a new online monitoring algorithm that caches satisfying instances when it can, and falls back to the brute force search when it cannot. Our key technical insight is a new flow-and time-sensitive static check of variable groundedness, called the temporal mode check, which determines subformulas for which such caching is feasible and those for which it is not and, hence, guides our algorithm. We prove the correctness of our algorithm and evaluate its performance over synthetic traces and realistic policies.
Introduction
Many organizations routinely collect sensitive personal information like medical and financial records to carry out business operations and to provide services to clients. These organizations must handle sensitive information in compliance with applicable privacy legislation like the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [1] and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) [2] . Violations attract substantial monetary and even criminal penalties [3] . Hence, developing mechanisms and automatic tools to check privacy policy compliance in organizations is an important problem.
The overarching goal of this paper is to improve the state of the art in checking whether an event trace or audit log, which records relevant events of an organization's data handling operations, is compliant with a given privacy policy. At a high-level, this problem can be approached in two different ways. First, logs may be recorded and compliance may be checked offline, when demanded by an audit authority. Alternatively, an online program may monitor privacyrelevant events, check them against the prevailing privacy policy and report violations on the fly. Both approaches have been considered in literature: An algorithm for offline compliance checking has been proposed by a subset of the authors [4] , whereas online monitoring has been the subject of extensive work by other researchers [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] .
These two lines of work have two common features. First, they both assume that privacy policies are represented in first-order temporal logic, extended with explicit time. Such extensions have been demonstrated adequate for representing the privacy requirements of both HIPAA and GLBA [12] . Second, to ensure that only finitely many instances of quantifiers are tested during compliance checking, both lines of work use static policy checks to restrict the syntax of the logic. The specific static checks vary, but always rely on assumptions about finiteness of predicates provided by the policy designer. Some work, e.g. [5, [8] [9] [10] [11] , is based on the safe-range check [5] , which requires syntactic subformulas to have finite support independent of each other; other work, e.g. [4, 7] , is based on the mode check from logic programming [13] [14] [15] , which is more general and can propagate variable groundedness information across subformulas.
Both lines of work have their relative advantages and disadvantages. An online monitor can cache policy-relevant information from logs on the fly (in so-called summary structures) and discard the remaining log immediately. This saves space. It also saves time because the summary structures are organized according to the policy formula so lookups are quicker than scans of the log in the offline method. However, online monitoring algorithms proposed so far require that all subformulas of the policy formula be amenable to caching. Furthermore, many real policies, including several privacy requirements of HIPAA and GLBA, are not amenable to such caching. In contrast, the offline algorithm proposed in our prior work [4] uses brute force search over a stored log. This is inefficient when compared to an online monitor, but it can handle all privacy requirements of HIPAA and GLBA. In this work, we combine the space-and time-efficiency of online monitoring with the generality of offline monitoring: We extend existing work in online monitoring [5] for privacy policy violations with a brute force search fallback based on offline audit for subformulas that are not amenable to caching. Like the work of Basin et al. [5] , our work uses policies written in metric first-order temporal logic (MFOTL) [16] .
Our key technical innovation is what we call the temporal mode check, a new static check on formulas to ensure finiteness of quantifier instantiation in our algorithm. Like a standard mode check, the temporal mode check is flow-sensitive: It can propagate variable groundedness information across subformulas. Additionally, the temporal mode check is time-sensitive: It conservatively approximates whether the grounding substitution for a variable comes from the future or the past. This allows us to classify all subformulas into those for which we build summary structures during online monitoring (we call such formulas buildable or B-formulas) and those for which we do not build summary structures and, hence, use brute force search.
As an example, consider the formula ∃x, y, z.(p(x) ∧ q(x, y) ∧ r(x, z)), which means that in all states, there exist x, y, z such that p(x) holds and in some past states q(x, y) and r(x, z) hold. Assume that p and q are finite predicates and that r is infinite, but given a ground value for its first argument, the second argument has finite computable support. One possible efficient strategy for monitoring this formula is to build summary structures for p and q and in each state where an x satisfying p exists, to quickly lookup the summary structure for q to find a past state and a y such that q(x, y) holds, and to scan the log brute force to find a past state and z such that r(x, z) holds. Note that doing so requires marking p and q as B-formulas, but r as not a B-formula (because z can be computed only after x is known, but x is known from satisfaction of p, which happens in the future of r). Unlike the safe-range check or the standard mode check, our new temporal mode check captures this information correctly and our monitoring algorithm, précis, implements this strategy. No existing work on online monitoring can handle this formula because r cannot be summarized [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . The work on offline checking can handle this formula [4] , it does not build summary structures and is needlessly inefficient on q.
We prove the correctness of précis over formulas that pass the temporal mode check and analyze its asymptotic complexity. We also empirically evaluate the performance of précis on synthetically generated traces, with respect to privacy policies derived from HIPAA and GLBA. The goal of our experiment is to demonstrate that incrementally maintaining summary structures for B-formulas of the policy can improve the performance of policy compliance checking relative to a baseline of pure brute force search. This baseline algorithm is very similar to the offline monitoring algorithm of [4] , called reduce. In our experiments, we observe marked improvements in running time over reduce, e.g., up to 2.5x-6.5x speedup for HIPAA and up to 1.5x speed for GLBA, even with very conservative (unfavorable) assumptions about disk access. Even though these speedups are not universal (online monitoring optimistically constructs summary structures and if those structures are not used later then computation is wasted), they do indicate that temporal mode checking and our monitoring algorithm could have substantial practical benefit for privacy policy compliance.
Due to space restrictions, we defer the correctness proof of précis and several other details to a technical report [17] .
Policy Specification Logic
Our policy specification logic, GMP, is a fragment of MFOTL [16, 18] with restricted universal quantifiers. The syntax of GMP is shown below.
The letter t denotes terms, which are constants or variables (x, y, etc.). Bold-faced roman letters like t denote sequences or vectors. Policy formulas are denoted by ϕ, α, and β. Universal quantifiers have a restricted form ∀x.ϕ 1 → ϕ 2 . A guard [19] ϕ 1 is required as explained further in Section 3.
Policy formulas include both past temporal operators ( , , S , ) and future temporal operators ( , , U , ). Each temporal operator has an associated time interval I of the form [lo, hi] , where lo, hi ∈ N and lo ≤ hi. The interval selects a sub-part of the trace in which the immediate subformula is interpreted. For example, [2, 6] ϕ means that at some point between 2 and 6 time units in the past, ϕ holds. For past temporal operators, we allow the higher limit (hi) of I to be ∞. We omit the interval when it is [0, ∞]. Policies must be future-bounded: both limits (lo and hi) of intervals associated with future temporal operators must be finite. GMP is not closed under negation due to the absence of the duals of operators S and U . However, these operators do not arise in the practical privacy policies we have investigated.
Formulas are interpreted over a timed event trace (or, log) L. Given a possiblyinfinite domain of terms D, each element of L-the ith element is denoted L imaps each ground atom p(t) for t ∈ D to either true or false. Each position L i is associated with a time stamp, τ i ∈ N, which is used to interpret intervals in formulas. We use τ to represent the sequence of time stamps, each of which is a natural number. For any arbitrary i, j ∈ N with i > j, τ i > τ j (monotonicity). The environment η maps free variables to values in D. Given an execution trace L and a time stamp-sequence τ , a position i ∈ N in the trace, an environment η, and a formula ϕ, we write L, τ, i, η |= ϕ to mean that ϕ is satisfied in the ith position of L with respect to η and τ . The definition of |= is standard and can be found in the technical report [17] . Example policy. The following GMP formula represents a privacy rule from clause §6802(a) of the U.S. privacy law GLBA [2] . It states that a financial institution can disclose to a non-affiliated third party any non-public personal information (e.g., name, SSN) if such financial institution provides (within 30 days) or has provided, to the consumer, a notice of the disclosure.
Temporal Mode Checking
We review mode-checking and provide an overview of our key insight, temporal mode-checking. Then, we define temporal mode-checking for GMP formally. Mode-checking. Consider a predicate addLessEq(x, y, a), meaning x + y ≤ a, where x, y, and a range over N. If we are given ground values for x and a, then the number of substitutions for y for which addLessEq(x, y, a) holds is finite. In this case, we may say that addLessEq's argument position 1 and 3 are input positions (denoted by '+') and argument position 2 is an output position (denoted by '−'), denoted addLessEq(x + , y − , a + ). Such a specification of inputs and outputs is called a mode-specification. The meaning of a mode-specification for a predicate is that if we are given ground values for arguments in the input positions, then the number of substitutions for the variables in the output positions that result in a satisfied relation is finite. For instance, addLessEq(x + , y + , a − ) is not a valid mode-specification. Mode analysis (or mode-checking) lifts inputoutput specifications on predicates to input-output specification on formulas. It is commonly formalized as a judgment χ in ϕ : χ out , which states that given a grounding substitution for variables in χ in , there is at most a finite set of substitutions for variables in χ out that could together satisfy ϕ. For instance, consider the formula ϕ ≡ p(x) ∧ q(x, y). Given the mode-specification p(x − ) and q(x + , y − ) and a left-to-right evaluation order for conjunction, ϕ passes mode analysis with χ in = {} and χ out = {x, y}. Mode analysis guides an algorithm to obtaining satisfying substitutions. In our example, we first obtain substitutions for x that satisfy p(x). Then, we plug ground values for x in q(x, y) to get substitutions for y. However, if the mode-specification is p(x + ) and q(x + , y − ), then ϕ will fail mode analysis unless x is already ground (i.e., x ∈ χ in ).
Mode analysis can be used to identify universally quantified formulas whose truth is finitely checkable. We only need to restrict universal quantifiers to the form ∀x.(ϕ 1 → ϕ 2 ), and require that x be in the output of ϕ 1 and that ϕ 2 be well-moded (x may be in its input). To check that ∀x.(ϕ 1 → ϕ 2 ) is true, we first find the values of x that satisfy ϕ 1 . This is a finite set because x is in the output of ϕ 1 . We then check that for each of these x's, ϕ 2 is satisfied.
Overview of temporal mode-checking. Consider the policy ϕ
q(x + , y − ) and consider the following obvious but inefficient way to monitor it: We wait for p(x) to hold for some x, then we look back in the trace to find a position where q(x, y) holds for some y. This is mode-compliant (we only check q with its input x ground) but requires us to traverse the trace backward whenever p(x) holds for some x, which can be slow.
Ideally, we would like to incrementally build a summary structure for q(x, y) containing all the substitutions for x and y for which the formula holds as the monitor processes each new trace event. When we see p(x), we could quickly look through the summary structure to check whether a relation of the form q(x, y) for the specific x and any y exists. However, note that building such a structure may be impossible here. Why? The mode-specification q(x + , y − ) tells us only that we will obtain a finite set of satisfying substitutions when x is already ground. However, in this example, the ground x comes from p, which holds in the future of q, so the summary structure may be infinite and, hence, unbuildable. In contrast, if the mode-specification of q is q(x − , y − ), then we can build the summary structure because, independent of whether or not x is ground, only a finite number of substitutions can satisfy q. In this example, we would label q(x, y) buildable or a B-formula when the mode-specification is q(x − , y − ) and a non-B-formula when the mode-specification is q(x + , y − ).
With conventional mode analysis, ϕ p is well-moded under both mode-specifications of q. Consequently, in order to decide whether ϕ p is a B-formula, we need a refined analysis which takes into account the fact that, with the modespecification q(x + , y − ), information about grounding of x flows backward in time from p to q and, hence, q(x, y) is not a B-formula. This is precisely what our temporal mode-check accomplishes: It tracks whether an input substitution comes from the past/current state, or from the future. By doing so, it provides enough information to determine which subformulas are B-formulas. Formally, our temporal mode-checking has two judgments:
The first judgment assumes that substitutions for χ C are available from the past or at the current time point; any subformula satisfying such a judgment is labeled as a B-formula. The second judgment assumes that substitutions for χ C are available from the past or at current time point, but those for χ F will be available in future. A formula satisfying such a judgment is not a B-formula but can be handled by brute force search. Our implementation of temporal mode analysis first tries to check a formula by the first judgment, and falls back to the second when it fails. The formal rules for mode analysis (described later) allow for both possibilities but do not prescribe a preference.
To keep things simple, we do not build summary structures for future formulas such as α U I β, and do not allow future formulas in the judgment form χ C B ϕ : χ O (however, we do build summary structures for nested pastsubformulas of future formulas). To check α U I β, we wait until the upper limit of I is exceeded and then search backward. As an optimization, one may build conservative summary structures for future formulas, as in some prior work [5] .
Recognizing B-formulas. We list selected rules of temporal mode-checking in Figure 1 . Rule B-Pre, which applies to an atom p(t 1 , . . . , t n ), checks that all variables in input positions of p are in χ C . The output χ O is the set of variables in output positions of p. (I(p) and O(p) are the sets of input and output positions of p, respectively.) The rule for conjunctions ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 first checks ϕ 1 and then checks ϕ 2 , propagating variables in the output of ϕ 1 to the input of ϕ 2 . These two rules are standard in mode-checking. The new, interesting rule is B-Since for the formula ϕ 1 S I ϕ 2 . Since structures for ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 could be built at time points earlier than the current time, the premise simply ignores the input χ C . The first premise of B-since checks ϕ 2 with an empty input. Based on the semantics of temporal logic, ϕ 1 needs to be true on the trace after ϕ 2 , so all variables ground by ϕ 2 (i.e., χ 1 ) are available as "current" input in ϕ 1 . As an example, {} B S q(x − , y − ) : {x, y}. Temporal mode-checking judgement. In the mode-checking judgment χ C , χ F ϕ : χ O , we separate the set of input variables for which substitutions are available at the current time point or from the past (χ C ) from the set of variables for which substitutions are available from the future (χ F ). The distinction is needed because sub-derivations of the form χ C B ϕ : χ O should be passed only the former variables as input.
Rule Pre for atoms checks that variables in input positions are in the union of χ C and χ F . There are four rules for ϕ 1 S I ϕ 2 , accounting for the buildability/nonbuildability of each of the two subformulas. We show only one of these four rules, Since-1, which applies when ϕ 2 is a B-formula but ϕ 1 is not. In this case, ϕ 2 will be evaluated (for creating the summary structure) at time points earlier than ϕ 1 S ϕ 2 and, therefore, cannot use variables in χ C or χ F as input (see Figure 2 ). When checking ϕ 1 , variables in the output of ϕ 2 (called χ 1 ), χ C and χ F are all inputs, but those in χ C or χ F come from the future. The entire formula is not a B-formula as ϕ 1 is not.
Similarly, there are four rules for ϕ 1 U I ϕ 2 , of which we show only one, Until-1. This rule applies when ϕ 2 is a B-formula, but ϕ 1 is not. Its first premise checks that ϕ 2 is a B-formula with input χ C . Our algorithm checks ϕ 1 only when ϕ 2 is true, so the outputs χ 1 of ϕ 2 are available as input for ϕ 1 . In checking ϕ 1 , both χ 1 and χ F may come from the future.
The first premise of rule UNIV-1 checks that the guard ϕ 1 is well-moded with some output χ 1 . The second premise, {x} ⊆ χ 1 , ensures that the guard ϕ 1 can be satisfied only for a finite number of substitutions for x, which is necessary to feasibly check ϕ 2 . The third premise, ensures that no variables other than x are additionally grounded by checking ϕ 1 .
The fourth premise, f v(ϕ 2 ) ⊆ (χ C ∪ χ F ∪ χ 1 ), ensures that all free variables in ϕ 2 are already grounded by the time ϕ 2 needs to be checked. The final premise ensures the well-modedness of ϕ 2 . The third and fourth premises are technical conditions, needed for the soundness of our algorithm.
Runtime Monitoring Algorithm
Our policy compliance algorithm précis takes as input a well-moded GMP policy ϕ, monitors the system trace as it grows, builds summary structures for nested B-formulas and reports a violation as soon as it is detected. We write σ to denote a substitution, a finite map from variables to values in the domain D. The identity substitution is denoted • and σ ⊥ represents an invalid substitution. For instance, the result of joining (1) two substitutions σ 1 and σ 2 that do not agree on the values of shared variables is σ ⊥ . We say that σ extends σ, written σ ≥ σ, if the domain of σ is a superset of the domain of σ and they agree on mappings of variables that are in the domain of σ. We summarize relevant algorithmic functions below. précis(ϕ) is the top-level function (Algorithm 1). checkCompliance(L, i, τ, π, ϕ) checks whether events in the ith position of the trace L satisfy ϕ, given the algorithm's internal state π and the time stamps τ . State π contains up-to-date summary structures for all B-formulas of ϕ. uSS(L, i, τ, π, ϕ) incrementally updates summary structures for B-formula ϕ when log position i is seen. It assumes that the input π is up-to-date w.r.t. earlier log positions and it returns the state with the updated summary structure for ϕ. (uSS abbreviates updateSummaryStructures). sat(L, i, τ, p(t), σ) returns the set of all substitutions σ 1 for free variables in p(t) that make p(t)σ 1 true in the ith position of L, given σ that grounds variables in the input positions of p. Here, σ 1 ≥ σ. ips(L, i, τ, π, σ, ϕ) generalizes sat from atomic predicates to policy formulas. It takes the state π as an input to look up summary structures when B-formulas are encountered.
Top-level monitoring algorithm. Algorithm 1 (précis), the top-level monitoring process, uses two pointers to log entries: curPtr points to the last entry in the log L, and evalPtr points to the position at which we next check whether ϕ is satisfied. Naturally, curPtr ≥ evalPtr. The gap between these two pointers is determined by the intervals occurring in future temporal operators in ϕ. For example, with the policy [lo,hi] β, β can be evaluated at log position i only after a position j ≥ i with τ j − τ i ≥ hi has been observed. We define a simple function ∆(ϕ) that computes a coarse but finite upper bound on the maximum time the monitor needs to wait before ϕ can be evaluated (see [17] for details). The algorithm précis first initializes relevant data structures and labels B-formulas using mode analysis (lines 1-2). The main body of the précis is a trace-event triggered loop. In each iteration of the loop, précis: (1) updates the summary structures in π based on the newly available log entries (lines 6-7), Extend L and τ with new entries 6:
for all (B-formulas ϕs of ϕ in ascending formula size) do 7:
π ← uSS(L, curPtr, τ, π, ϕs) //update summary structures 8:
while (evalPtr ≤ curPtr) do 9:
if (τ curPtr − τ evalPtr ≥ ∆(ϕ)) then 10:
tV al ← checkCompliance(L, evalPtr, τ, π, ϕ) 11:
if tV al = f alse then 12:
Report violation on L position evalPtr 13:
evalPtr ← evalPtr + 1 14:
else 15: break 16:
curPtr ← curPtr + 1
and (2) evaluates the policy at positions where it can be fully evaluated, i.e., where the difference between the entry's time point and the current time point (curP tr) exceeds the maximum delay ∆(ϕ).
Step (1) uses the function uSS and step (2) uses the function checkCompliance. checkCompliance is a wrapper for ips that calls ips with • as the input substitution. If ips returns an empty set of satisfying substitutions, checkCompliance returns false, signaling a violation at the current time point, else it returns true.
Finding substitutions for policy formulas. The recursive function ips returns the set of substitutions that satisfy a formula at a given log position, given a substitution for the formula's input variables. Selected clauses of the definition of ips are shown in Figure 3 . When the formula is an atom, ips invokes sat, an abstract wrapper around specific implementations of predicates. When the policy is a universally quantified formula, ips is called on the guard ϕ 1 to find the guard's satisfying substitutions Σ 1 . Then, ips is called to check that ϕ 2 is true for all substitutions in Σ 1 . If the latter fails, ips returns the empty set of substitutions to signal a violation, else it returns {σ in }.
When a B-formula α S I β is encountered, all its satisfying substitutions have already been computed and stored in π. Therefore, ips simply finds these substitutions in π (expression π.A(α S I β)(i).IR), and discards those that are inconsistent with σ in by performing a join (1) . For the non-B-formula α S I β, ips calls itself recursively on the sub-formulas α and β, and computes the substitutions brute force.
Incrementally updating summary structures. We explain how we update summary structures for formulas of the form ϕ 1 S I ϕ 2 here. Updates for I ϕ, I ϕ, and I ϕ are similar and can be found in the technical report [17] . ips(L, i, τ, π, σin, p(t)) = sat(L, i, τ, p(t), σin) , and IR (−1) to be empty (the same applies for other structures too). We show here how the structures S β and IR are updated. We defer the description of update of S α to the technical report [17] .
To update the structure S β , we first calculate the set Σ β of substitutions that make β true at i by calling ips. Pairing all these substitutions with the position i yields S β new . Next, we compute the set S β remove of all old σ, k pairs that do not satisfy the interval constraint [lo, hi] (i.e., for which τ i − τ k > hi). The updated structure S i β is then obtained by taking a union of S β new and the old structure S (i−1) β , and removing all the pairs in the set S β remove .
To compute the summary structure IR for α S I β at i, we first compute the set S R1 of all substitutions for which the formula β is true in the ith position and the interval constraint is respected by the position i. Then we compute S R2 as the join σ 1 σ 1 of substitutions σ for which β was satisfied at some prior position k, and substitutions σ 1 for which α is true from position k + 1 to i. The updated structure IR i is the union of S R1 and S R2 .
Optimizations. When all temporal sub-formulas of ϕ are B-formulas, curPtr and evalPtr proceed in synchronization and only the summary structure for position curPtr needs to be maintained. When ϕ contains future temporal formulas but all past temporal sub-formulas of ϕ are B-formulas, then we need to maintain only the summary structures for positions in [evalPtr, curPtr], but the rest of the log can be discarded immediately. When ϕ contains at least one past temporal subformula that is not a B-formula we need to store the slice of the trace that contains all predicates in that non-B-formula.
The following theorem states that on well-moded policies, précis terminates and is correct. The theorem requires that the internal state π be strongly consistent at curP tr with respect to the log L, time stamp sequence τ , and policy ϕ. Strong consistency means that the state π contains sound and complete substitutions for all B-formulas of ϕ for all trace positions in [0, curP tr] (see [17] ). Correctness of précis) . For all GMP policies ϕ, for all evalP tr, curP tr ∈ N, for all traces L, for all time stamp sequences τ , for all internal states π, for all empty environments η 0 such that (1) π is strongly consistent at curP tr with respect to L, τ , and ϕ, (2) curP tr ≥ evalP tr and τ curPtr − τ evalPtr ≥ ∆(ϕ), and (3 Proof. By induction on the policy formula ϕ (see [17] ).
Theorem 1 (
) {}, {} ϕ : χ O where χ O ⊆ f v(ϕ),
Complexity of précis.
The runtime complexity of one iteration of précis for a given policy ϕ is |ϕ| × (complexity of the uSS function) + (complexity of ips function), where |ϕ| is the policy size. We first analyze the runtime complexity of ips. Suppose the maximum number of substitutions returned by a single call to sat (for any position in the trace) is F and the maximum time required by sat to produce one substitution is A. The worst case runtime of ips occurs when all subformulas of ϕ are non-B-formulas of the form ϕ 1 S ϕ 2 and in that case 
Implementation and Evaluation
This section reports an experimental evaluation of the précis algorithm. All measurements were made on a 2.67GHz Intel Xeon CPU X5650 running Debian GNU/Linux 7 (Linux kernel 3.2.48.1.amd64-smp) on 48GB RAM, of which at most 2.2GB is used in our experiments. We store traces in a SQLite database. Each n-ary predicate is represented by a n+1 column table whose first n columns store arguments that make the predicate true on the trace and the last column stores the trace position where the predicate is true. We index each table by the columns corresponding to input positions of the predicate. We experiment with randomly generated synthetic traces. Given a GMP policy and a target trace length, at each trace point, our synthetic trace generator randomly decides whether to generate a policy-compliant action or a policy violating action. For a compliant action, it recursively traverses the syntax of the policy and creates trace actions to satisfy the policy. Disjunctive choices are resolved randomly. Non-compliant actions are handled dually. The source code and traces used in the experiments are available from the authors' homepages.
Our goal is to demonstrate that incrementally maintaining summary structures for B-formulas can improve the performance of policy compliance checking. Our baseline for comparison is a variant of précis that does not use any summary structures and, hence, checks temporal operators by brute force scanning. This baseline algorithm is very similar to the reduce algorithm of prior work [4] and, indeed, in the sequel we refer to our baseline as reduce. For the experimental results reported here, we deliberately hold traces in an in-memory SQLite database. This choice is conservative; using a disk-backed database improves précis' performance relative to reduce because reduce accesses the database more intensively (our technical report contains comparative evaluation using a disk-backed database and confirms this claim [17] ). Another goal of our experiment is to identify how précis scales when larger summary structures must be maintained. Accordingly, we vary the upper bound hi in intervals [lo, hi] in past temporal operators.
We experiment with two privacy policies that contain selected clauses of HIPAA and GLBA, respectively. As précis and reduce check compliance of non-B-formulas similarly, to demonstrate the utility of building summary structures, we ensure that the policies contain B-formulas (in our HIPAA policy, 7 out of 8 past temporal formulas are B-formulas; for GLBA the number is 4 out of 9). Our technical report [17] lists the policies we used. Figure 4 show our evaluation times for the HIPAA privacy policy for the following upper bounds on the past temporal operators: 100, 1000, 3000, and ∞. Points along the x-axis are the size of the trace and also the number of privacy-critical events checked. The y-axis represents the average monitoring time per event. We plot four curves for each bound: (1) The time taken by précis, (2) The time taken by reduce, formance. For trace lengths greater than the bound, the curves flatten out, as expected. As the bound increases, the average execution time for reduce increases as the algorithm has to look back further on the trace, and so does the relative advantage of précis. Overall, précis achieves a speedup up of 2.5x-6.5x over reduce after the curves flatten out in the HIPAA policy. The results for GLBA, not shown here but discussed in our technical report [17] are similar, with speedups of 1.25x to 1.5x. The technical report also describes the amount of memory needed to store summary structures in précis. Briefly, this number grows proportional to the minimum of trace length and policy bound. The maximum we observe (for trace length 13000 and bound ∞) is 2.2 GB, which is very reasonable. This can be further improved by compression.
Algorithms

Incomplete states allowed?
Mode of operation Summary structures (past formulas) Summary structures (future formulas) précis no online yes no reduce [4] yes offline no no Chomicki [8, 9] no online yes no Krukow et al. [10] Bauer et al. [11] yes online yes no Basin et al. [5, 7] no online yes yes Basin et al. [6] yes online yes yes Bauer et al. [20] no online (automata)* (automata)* Table 1 : Comparison of design choices in précis and prior work using firstorder temporal logic for privacy compliance. *Automata-based approaches have no explicit notion of summary structures.
Related Work
Runtime monitoring of propositional linear temporal logic (pLTL) formulas [21] , regular expressions, finite automata, and other equivalent variants has been studied in literature extensively . However, pLTL and its variants are not sufficient to capture the privacy requirements of legislation like HIPAA and GLBA.
To address this limitation, many logics and languages have been proposed for specifying privacy policies. Some examples are P3P [49, 50] , EPAL [51, 52] , Privacy APIs [53] , LPU [54, 55] , past-only fragment of first-order temporal logic (FOTL) [10, 11] , predLTL [56] , pLogic [57] , PrivacyLFP [12] , MFOTL [5] [6] [7] , the guarded fragment of first-order logic with explicit time [4] , and P-RBAC [58] . Our policy language, GMP, is more expressive than many existing policy languages such as LPU [54, 55] , P3P [49, 50] , EPAL [51, 52] , and P-RBAC [58] .
In Table 1 , we summarize design choices in précis and other existing work on privacy policy compliance checking using first-order temporal logics. The column "Incomplete states allowed?" indicates whether the work can handle some form of incompleteness in observation about states. Our own prior work [4] presents the algorithm reduce that checks compliance of a mode-checked fragment of FOL policies with respect to potentially incomplete logs. This paper makes the mode check time-aware and adds summary structures to reduce, but we assume that our event traces have complete information in all observed states.
Bauer et al. [11] present a compliance-checking algorithm for the (non-metric) past fragment of FOTL. GMP can handle both past and future (metric) temporal operators. However, Bauer et al. allow counting operators, arbitrary computable functions, and partial observability of events, which we do not allow. They allow a somewhat simplified guarded universal quantification where the guard is a single predicate. In GMP, we allow the guard of the universal quantification to be a complex GMP formula. For instance, the following formula cannot be expressed in the language proposed by Bauer et al. but GMP mode checks it: ∀x, y. (q(x + , y + ) S p(x − , y − )) → r(x + , y + ). Moreover, Bauer et al. only consider closed formulas and also assume that each predicate argument position is output. We do not insist on these restrictions. In further development, Bauer et al. [20] , propose an automata-based, incomplete monitoring algorithm for a frag-ment of FOTL called LTL FO . They consider non-safety policies (unbounded future operators), which we do not consider.
Basin et al. [5] present a runtime monitoring algorithm for a fragment of MFOTL. Our summary structures are directly inspired by this work and the work of Chomicki [8, 9] . We improve expressiveness through the possibility of brute force search similar to [4] , when subformulas are not amenable to summarization. Basin et al. build summary structures for future operators, which we do not (such structures can be added to our monitoring algorithm). In subsequent work, Basin et al. [6] extend their runtime monitoring algorithm to handle incomplete logs and inconsistent logs using a three-valued logic, which we do not consider. In more recent work, Basin et al. [7] extend the monitoring algorithm to handle aggregation operators and function symbols, which GMP does not include. These extensions are orthogonal to our work.
Our temporal mode check directly extends mode checking from [4] by adding time-sensitivity, although the setting is different- [4] is based on first-order logic with an explicit theory of linear time whereas we work with MFOTL. The added time-sensitivity allows us to classify subformulas into those that can be summarized and those that must be brute forced. Some prior work, e.g. [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] , is based on the safe-range check instead of the mode check. The safe-range check is less expressive than a mode check. For example, the safe-range check does not accept the formula q(x + , y + , z − ) S p(x − , y − ), but our temporal mode check does (however, the safe-range check will accept the formula q(x − , y − , z − ) S p(x − , y − )). More recent work [7] uses a static check intermediate in expressiveness between the safe-range check and a full-blown mode check.
Conclusion
We have presented a privacy policy compliance-checking algorithm for a fragment of MFOTL. The fragment is characterized by a novel temporal mode-check, which, like a conventional mode-check, ensures that only finitely many instantiations of quantifiers are tested but is, additionally, time-aware and can determine which subformulas of the policy are amenable to construction of summary structures. Using information from the temporal mode-check, our algorithm précis performs best-effort runtime monitoring, falling back to brute force search when summary structures cannot be constructed. Empirical evaluation shows that summary structures improve performance significantly, compared to a baseline without them.
